TEAM 342
2000 PHILIP C. JESSUP
INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT THE PEACE PALACE
THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS
Case Concerning the Seabed Mining Facility

REPUBLIC OF EREBUS
Applicant
V.

KINGDOM OF MERAPI
Respondent

SPRING TERM 2001

MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT

New England School of Law, United States of America
Team Members: Ann Cascanett, Curtis Carpenter,
Raymond Tamayo, and Katya Novtochina

272 ILSA Journal of International& Comparative Law [Vol. 8:271

THE CASE CONCERNING
THE SEABED MINING FACILITY
274

I.
II.
III.
IV.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .......................................
QUESTIONS PRESENTED To THE COURT ...........................
STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ............................................

V.

PLEADINGS .............................................................. 280

A.

B.

The Legitimate Boundary Between Erebus
and Merapi is the PresentLocation of the
Krakatoa River's PrincipalArm .............................
1.
Merapi and Erebus are bound by the
terms of the Treaty of Amity and
Peace, which explicitly establishes
their land and maritime boundaries ..................
2.
Under the doctrine of accretion, the
Erebian-Merapin border followed the
gradual southerly shift of the
Krakatoa's principal arm ..............................
3.
The shifting of the Krakatoa River
has placed the Alma Shoals and the
adjacent petroleum reserves within
the exclusive economic zone of
Erebus .....................................................
Merapi is Liable for Its Unjustified Seizure
of ErebianFishing Vessels in the Alma
Shoals .............................................................
1. Irrespective of the legal status of the
Alma Shoals, Merapi's seizure and
subjection to forfeiture proceedings
of the Erebian fishing vessels is
unlaw ful ....................................................
2.
Merapi's unlawful seizure and
forfeiture of Erebian-flagged ships
provided Erebus the right to send
naval vessels to protect Erebian ships
fishing in the Shoals ....................................

274

275
278

280

280

282

283

284

284

285

DistinguishedBrief

20011
3.

C.

D.

E.

International law requires Merapi to
return the six unlawfully seized
fishing vessels or make reparations to
Erebus on behalf of their owners .....................
The ErebianDeep Seabed Mining
Operationis not In Violation of
InternationalLaw ...............................................
1.
International law imposes no
obligation upon Erebus to refrain
from mining the deep seabed under
international waters .....................................
2.
The Erebian facility conforms to the
customary international law doctrine
of freedom of the high seas and the
duty of states to protect the natural
environment ..............................................
3.
Merapi is estopped from asserting
that the Erebian seabed mining
facility is in violation of international
law . ........................................................
Merapi is Liablefor the Destructionof the
Erebian Seabed Mining Facility and the
Killing of ErebianNationals..................................
1.
Under the Principles of State
Responsibility, Merapi is responsible
for the Aqua Protectors' attack,
either by its acts or by its omissions .................
2.
Merapi's support of the Aqua
Protectors was not justified as an act
of self-defense consistent with Article
51 of the U.N. Charter .................................
InternationalLaw Requires Merapi to
Compensate Erebusfor the Destruction of
the Mining Facility and Killing of Erebian
Nationals, as well as Surrenderthe
Perpetratorsof the Attack to Erebusfor
Prosecution ......................................................

285

286

286

289

289

290

290

291

296

274 ILSA Journal of International & ComparativeLaw [Vol. 8:271
1.

International law requires Merapi to
compensate for the unlawful
destruction of Erebian property .......................
2.
International law requires Merapi to
compensate for the unlawful killing
of Erebian citizens ......................................
3.
International law requires Merapi to
surrender the members of the Aqua
Protectors responsible for the attack
on the seabed mining facility ..........................
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ...................................................
VII. INDEX OF AuTHoRrrEs ...............................................
A. Treaties and Other International
Instruments .......................................................
B.
U.N. Resolutions and Documents............................
C. InternationalCases .............................................
D. Cases (MunicipalCourts) .....................................
E.
Treatises and Books ............................................
F.
Journalsand Yearbooks .......................................
G. Other Documents and Miscellaneous .......................

296

296

297
299
300
300
300
301
302
303
304
305

I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Statute of the Court, the Republic of
Erebus and the Kingdom of Merapi, by a special agreement dated 1
November 2000, have agreed to submit their present dispute concerning
maritime boundary delimitation and the seabed mining facility to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under Article 36(1) of the
Statute of the Court.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO THE COURT
1. Whether the Treaty of Amity and Peace established the ErebianMerapin boundary as being the middle of the Krakatoa River's
principal arm, irrespective of any subsequent movement in the location
of said arm;
2. Whether the shift that has occurred in the location of the Krakatoa
River's principle arm is governed by the doctrine of accretion;
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3. Whether the shift in the Krakatoa's main arm has resulted in placing
the Alma Shoals and the adjacent petroleum reserves within the
Erebian exclusive economic zone;
4. Whether Merapi acted in violation of international law when it seized
and subjected to forfeiture proceedings six Erebian-flagged vessels
fishing in the Alma Shoals;
5.

Whether Erebus acted consistent with international law when, in
response to the Merapin seizures, it provided naval escorts to Erebian
fishing vessels in the Alma Shoals;
6. Whether Merapi is required to return or compensate for the Erebian
fishing vessels it seized in the Alma Shoals;
7. Whether the establishment of the Erebian deep seabed mining facility
under the high seas was inconsistent with international law;
8.

Whether Merapi is prevented by the doctrine of equitable estoppel
from asserting that the Erebian seabed mining facility is not in
compliance with international law;

9. Whether the Aqua Protectors' attack on the Erebian seabed mining
facility is imputable to the government of Merapi;
10. Whether Merapi's involvement in the Aqua Protectors' attack was
justifiable as self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter;
11. Whether Merapi had authorization from the United Nations Security
Council to attack the Erebian seabed mining facility;
12. Whether Merapi is required to compensate Erebus for the cost of
repairing the seabed mining facility and lost profits while such repair is
underway;
13. Whether Merapi is required to compensate Erebus for the loss of life
inflicted by the Aqua Protectors' attack; and
14. Whether Merapi must extradite the responsible members of the Aqua
Protectors for prosecution in Erebus.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of the Kingdom of Merapi's seizure of Erebianflagged fishing vessels and its support for a deadly attack on the Erebian
government's seabed mining facility. (Compromis
7, 18; Clarifications
4).
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The Kingdom of Merapi borders the Republic of Erebus to its south.
(Comp. 12). In 1947, Erebus and Merapi entered into the Treaty of Amity
and Peace, which established their common land border as the midpoint of
the principal arm of the Krakatoa River. (Comp. 13, 4). The Krakatoa
River follows an easterly path and forms a large uninhabited delta before
reaching the Etna Sea. (Comp. 2; Clar. 12). The Treaty also marked the
nations' maritime boundary as extending out to sea from the midpoint of the
principle arm of the Krakatoa River. (Comp. 14).
At the time the Treaty was prepared, the principle arm lay between
Pigeon Rock to the south and the Cape of Realto to the north. (Comp. 4).
As a result, the Alma Shoals and its fish-stocks were placed within the
contiguous waters of Merapi. (Comp. 2). Notwithstanding, vessels from
Erebus and other nations fished the area without provoking a response from
Merapi. (Clar. 3).
Over time, hurricane-induced erosion has shifted the principal arm of
the Krakatoa southward, so as today Pigeon Rock lies to the north of the
principal arm. (Comp. 5). The river's previous main arm has ceased to
exist as a distinct topographical feature. (Comp. 5; Clar. 1). Drawing the
maritime boundary from the midpoint of the river's new principal arm
establishes the Alma Shoals as now being within the exclusive economic
zone of Erebus. (Comp. 5).
In early 1999, an Erebian oil company discovered petroleum reserves
approximately 50 nautical miles from shore and adjacent to the Alma Shoals.
(Comp. 5; Clar. 3). In August 1999, Erebus clarified its position that the
Treaty of Amity and Peace places the Alma Shoals and the petroleum
reserves within Erebian waters. (Comp. 6). Shortly thereafter, the Prime
Minister of Merapi issued a communiqud, which stated that any
interpretation of the Treaty as giving Erebus claim to this territory would
constitute an act of hostility. (Comp. 6). Additionally, the Prime Minister
threatened the seizure of Erebian fishing vessels operating in the Shoals.
(Comp. 6). Erebus did not alter its position in response, and vessels
bearing its flag continued to fish the Shoals. (Comp. 7).
Several months after the communiqu6, the Merapin navy seized six
Erebian fishing vessels found in the Shoals. (Comp. 7). The crews of these
ships were released unharmed; however, the ships themselves were
confiscated for their alleged trespass. (Comp. 7). In response, Erebus
offered to provide naval escorts to any Erebian vessel wishing to exercise its
right to fish in the Alma Shoals. (Comp. 7). No further confrontations
between Erebian and Merapin vessels have occurred in the Shoals region.
(Comp. 7). However, Erebus continues to demand the release of the six
captured vessels bearing its flag. (Comp. 21).
Erebus's northern neighbor is the powerful state of Fogo, whose
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territorial ambitions have created hostile relations, resulting in sporadic
military confrontation. (Comp. 1). In response to Fogo's aggression,
Erebus has been forced to embark upon a buildup of its defensive forces.
(Comp. 19). Some of the weapon systems that Erebus is developing require
the procurement of minerals such as manganese, cobalt, nickel, and copper.
(Comp. 19). While Erebus has a modem, developed economy, it is almost
totally dependent on imports for its mineral needs. (Comp. 1.) In response
to this critical strategic weakness, Erebus spent a number of years studying
deep seabed nodules as a potentially dependable and economically viable
source of minerals. (Comp. 19.)
In April 2000, Erebus announced to the world its intention to begin
mining manganese nodules in international waters approximately 300
nautical miles beyond Merapi's exclusive economic zone. (Comp. 19).
Government owned and operated facility was being constructed 5,000 feet
below the surface of the water with mining scheduled to begin by the end of
September 2000. (Comp.
9; Clar. 4).
This announcement was
accompanied by the release of an exhaustive report conducted by the Chair
of the Department of Environmental Science of the University of Erebus.
(Comp. 10). This report, which was the result of computer modeling and
site comparison research, vouched for the environmental safety of the
project. (Comp. 10; Clar. 4).
On August 15, 2000, the President of the United Nations' Security
Council released a statement regarding concerns over the Erebian seabed
mining facility. (Comp. 12). The statement asked Erebus to postpone
mining until it could prove to the Council that the operation would not harm
the fish-stocks of the nearby Grand Basin. (Comp. 12; Corrections 2). In
a prompt reply to the Security Council, Erebus noted that while it had
announced its seabed mining plans some six months prior, Merapi had never
protested these plans. (Comp. 13). While Erebus could appreciate the
Council's concerns, Erebus declined to postpone the mining operation at
such a late date. (Comp. 13). Erebus believed the operation to be fully
tested and proven safe. (Comp. 13). Additionally, due to continued tense
relations with Fogo, Erebus had an immediate need for minerals for selfdefense purposes. (Comp. 13).
Merapi's first diplomatic correspondence regarding the seabed
mining operation was an August 25, 2000 note to the Security Council, in
which Merapi requested that the Council take actions to prevent Erebus from
beginning its mining operation. (Comp. 14). While the Council stated its
intention "to remain seized of the matter," it took no official action in
response to Merapi's request. (Comp. 15).
On the morning of September 1, 2000, saboteurs bombed the
Erebian seabed mining facility. (Comp. 16). The bombing of the facility
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resulted in the death of six Erebian civilians who at the time of the blast
were working on a temporary platform. (Comp. 16). Additionally, the
explosion resulted in over U.S. $1 billion in damages to the physical plant
that will take over a year to repair. (Comp. 16).
Later that same day, a Merapi-based organization calling itself the
"Aqua Protectors" claimed responsibility for the attack, which it referred to
as "Operation Sea Storm." (Comp. 11, 16). Within hours, Merapi
delivered a diplomatic note to the Security Council in which it denied either
planning or participating in the attack. (Comp. 117). However, the same
day the Merapi Times reported that the government of Merapi had prior
knowledge of the operation and had financially backed the attack with US
$100,000. (Comp. 18; Corrections 3). This report was later confirmed
during routine oversight hearings in the Merapin Legislature. (Comp. 18).
Erebus immediately demanded that Merapi pay for the damage and loss
of life caused by this attack. (Comp. 119). Additionally, Erebus demanded
that Merapi extradite the responsible members of the Aqua Protectors for
prosecution in Erebus on charges of homicide and destruction of government
property. (Comp. 119; Clar. 6). Some of the individuals responsible are
Merapin citizens, while others are nationals of a third state to Merapi's
south. (Clar. 5.) To date, Merapi has neither extradited nor prosecuted any
of these individuals. (Comp. 19; Clar. 6). They remain free from police
custody, amidst the general population of Merapi. (Clar. 16).
On October 1, 2000, after a series of diplomatic talks, the parties
agreed to submit their dispute to the International Court of Justice. (Comp.
22).
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A. The Erebian-Merapin border is the present location of the Krakatoa
River's principal arm. Erebus and Merapi are bound by the terms of
the Treaty of Amity and Peace, the plain meaning of which establishes
their boundary as the middle of the principal arm of the Krakatoa,
irrespective of changes in the river's location. Over time, hurricaneinduced erosion has shifted the river's principle arm southward. Since
this movement was of a gradual nature, the doctrine of accretion
dictates that the Erebian-Merapin boundary moved with the shift in the
river. Consequently, the Alma Shoals, as well as the adjacent
petroleum reserves, now lie within the Erebian exclusive economic
zone, entitling Erebus to exploit and regulate the sea and seabed
resources of that area.
B. Independent of the issue of the location of the Erebian-Merapin
maritime boundary, Merapi's seizure and submission to forfeiture
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procedures of Erebian vessels fishing in the Alma Shoals was a
violation of international law. Erebus was, thus, justified in sending
its naval vessels into the Alma Shoals to protect other Erebian fishing
vessels. International law requires that Merapi must either return the
six unlawfully seized vessels bearing the Erebian flag, or pay Erebus
reparations equal to their value.
C. The Erebian deep seabed mining operation was not in violation of
international law. Erebus is a party to neither the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention nor the 1994 Agreement on Implementing Part XI of the
1982 Convention.
The seabed mining provisions of the 1982
Convention and the 1994 Agreement do not constitute customary
international law binding on non-parties.
Thus, Erebus is not
restricted by the seabed mining provisions in these agreements, and
may mine the seabed consistent with the customary international law
freedom of the high seas doctrine.
Finally, the United Nations
Security Council Presidential Statement did not create a binding
obligation upon Erebus to forbear from commencing its seabed mining
operation. In any event, the doctrine of estoppel bars any claim that
Merapi may have had concerning the legality of the Erebian seabed
mining facility, since it made no protest during the construction of the
billion-dollar facility.
D. Merapi is liable for the destruction of the Erebian seabed mining
facility and the killing of Erebian nationals. Under the principles of
state responsibility, Merapi's financial support to the Aqua Protectors,
with prior knowledge of their planned attack against the Erebian
facility, amounts to a use of force against the property and citizens of
Erebus. Since Merapi had knowledge of the Aqua Protectors' plan,
Merapi was obligated to warn Erebus and to take other reasonable
measures to prevent the Aqua Protectors' attack. Merapi's support of
the Aqua Protectors was not justified as self-defense consistent with
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, because Article 51 does not
authorize anticipatory self-defense, and even if it did, the potential for
economic or environmental harm would not constitute an "armed
attack" triggering such a right. In any event, Merapi's actions were
inconsistent
with
the
requirements
of
"necessity"
and
"proportionality." Merapi's actions were unnecessary, both because
the United Nations Security Council was actively engaged in the
dispute and because Merapi failed to exhaust all available peaceful
measures. Merapi's actions were also disproportional, since the attack
needlessly resulted in the death of civilians.
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E. International law requires Merapi to compensate Erebus for the
destruction of the mining facility and the killing of Erebian nationals,
as well as to extradite the responsible parties to Erebus for
prosecution. Merapi's refusal to extradite cannot be justified by resort
to the political offense exception as the Aqua Protectors do not qualify
as "political offenders" under any of the internationally excepted tests
for determining the exception's applicability.
V. PLEADINGS
A. The Legitimate Boundary Between Erebus and Merapi is the
PresentLocation of the Krakatoa River's PrincipalArm
1. Merapi and Erebus are bound by the terms of the Treaty of
Amity and Peace, which explicitly establishes their land and
maritime boundaries.
A treaty is a written agreement between states, governed by
international law.' All treaties are binding upon their contracting parties. 2
In 1947, Erebus and Merapi entered into the Treaty of Amity and Peace
[hereinafter "Treaty"], which established their common land and
maritime boundaries. As parties to this treaty, Erebus and Merapi are
bound by its terms.
a. The plain meaning of the Treaty establishes the borderas the midpoint
of the principalarm of the Krakatoa River, irrespective of the river's
location.
A treaty is to be understood according to the plain meaning of its
terms, subject to the context in which they appear, with an eye towards
the purpose of the instrument.4 Unless it leads to a reading that is
ambiguous or patently unreasonable, the plain meaning is definitive.The Treaty establishes the Erebian-Merapin land border as being

1. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A./CONF. 39/27 (1971), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 876 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention). See also LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OFTREATIES 4 (1961).
2.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 26. See also Richard D. Kearney &
Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L. L. 495, 516 (1970).
3.
Compromis 3, 4.
4.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 31. See also Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. (Dec. 13), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 310, 320 (2000). See also Oil
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803, 812 (Prelim. Obj., Dec. 12).
5.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 32.
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"the midpoint of the Krakatoa River."' The Treaty is thus clear that the
border is the river itself, and not an indelible line fixed by a surveyor's
level and compass. The Treaty states that the maritime boundary
extends from "the mouth of the Krakatoa River, taking as the mouth
of the river its principal arm . . . "I The Treaty, thus, again utilizes an
impermanent, rather than a geographically fixed, marker. The Treaty
goes on to identify the river's principal arm as "lying between Pigeon
Rock to the South, and the Cape of Realto to the North.", The context
in which this phrase is employed compels the interpretation that it was
meant as a contemporary identification of the principle arm, and not a
condition precedent to using the principal arm to mark the boundary.
The Treaty's plain meaning clearly establishes that the ErebianMerapin land and maritime boundaries are indeterminate in nature,
subject to change with the course of the Krakatoa. There is nothing
unreasonable about this interpretation, as despite their fundamental
impermanence, states routinely use the course of rivers to mark their
boundaries.' Moreover, Merapi was aware that the Krakatoa had
shifted course in the past,' 0 yet it did not insist on a clause, such as
exists in the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Agreement," stating that the
boundary would not move with the river, perhaps because the previous
shift had been favorable to Merapi.
b. Evidence of the circumstancessurrounding the Treaty's conclusion
confirm that the reference to Pigeon Rock and the Cape of Realto was
meant for contemporary identificationpurposes only.
Recourse to extrinsic evidence, such as preparatory work and
evidence of the circumstances surrounding a treaty's conclusion, is allowed
for the purpose of confirming a treaty's interpretation.' 2 The circumstances
surrounding agreement on the Erebian-Merapin maritime boundary
indicate that the parties were primarily interested in setting forth "an

6.
7.
8.

Comp. 4.
Id.
Id.

9.
See STEPHEN B. JONES, BOUNDARY-MAKING:
TREATY AND BOUNDARY COMMISSIONERS 108 (1971).

A HANDBOOK FOR STATESMEN,

10. Clarifications 2.
11. See Israel-Jordan: Treaty of Peace, Oct. 26, 1994, Isr.-Jordan, Annex I(a), reprinted
in 34 I.L.M. 43 (1995).
12. See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 32. See also Kearney, supra note 2, at
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objectively identifiable boundary."" This extrinsic evidence, thus, confirms
that the purpose of the phrase "said arm lying between Pigeon Rock to the
South, and the Cape of Realto to the North," was to identify the principal
arm's location at the time. This phrase is now obsolete, since the new
principal arm is in itself an objectively identifiable boundary, as its
location is uncontested, while the previous riverbed has ceased to exist as a
4
distinct topographical feature.

2. Under the doctrine of accretion, the Erebian-Merapin border
followed the gradual southerly shift of the Krakatoa's principal arm.
The shifting of riparian boundaries is governed by either the doctrine
of accretion or avulsion, depending on the speed at which the change
occurs." When the course of the river changes over time, accretion
dictates that the boundary follows the altered course." When the river's
path is suddenly altered, avulsion leaves the boundary in the middle of the
now abandoned riverbed. 7
A typical avulsion was displayed in the case of Arkarias v. Tennessee,
wherein the Mississippi River changed its course over a period of 30 hours so
as to abandon 20 miles of the riverbed. ' Alternatively, accretion was
illustrated by the case of Nebraska v. Iowa, wherein the Missouri River
markedly changed course over a period of several years." In that case, Nebraska
argued that, due to local soil conditions, large sections of riverbank often collapsed
into the river, thus, the change was "not gradual and irnperctepible, but sudden and
visible," and consequently, inconsistent with accretion.- The United States
Supreme Court, however, found the doctrine of accretion to apply, because the
change, though relatively rapid, was the product of an ongoing erosive process
2
and not a swift and singular event. '

Gradually, over a period of several years, hurricane-induced erosion
shifted the Krakatoa's principal arm southward." Thus, according to the
principle of accretion, the boundary moved with the shift in the river.2
13. Comp. 4.
14. Comp. 4, 5; Clar. 1.
15. See 72 AM. JUf. 2d, States §27 (1974). See, e.g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359,.
369 (1892).
16. See 45 AM. JUR. 2d, InternationalLaw §29 (1999).
17. See id.
18. See Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 162 (1917).
19. 143 U.S. at 369-70 (1892).
20. d. at 367-68.
21. See id. at 368-70.
22. Comp. 5.
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3. The shifting of the Krakatoa River has placed the Alma Shoals
and the adjacent petroleum reserves within the exclusive economic
zone of Erebus.
All states are entitled to an exclusive economic zone [hereinafter "EEZ"]
extending 200 nautical miles beyond their coastal baseline.2 First codified in
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention [hereinafter "UNCLOS"], the concept
of the EEZ has ripened into customary international law." Within their
EEZ, states have an exclusive right to non-living resources and a preferential
right to living resources 26 It should be noted, the relative socio-economic
conditions of the parties are irrelevant in the resolution of a maritime boundary
dispute.27 Thus, any contention that Merapi's economic conditions should
influence the Court's judgment must be rejected as "[s]uch considerations are
totally unrelated to the underlying intention of the applicable rules of
international law. "

Drawing the maritime boundary from the midpoint of the Krakatoa
River's new principal arm establishes that the newly discovered petroleum
reserves and the Alma Shoals lie within the EEZ of Erebus. 2' Erebus, thus,
has the exclusive right to any petroleum found in the zone and a priority
right to the zone's living resources.20

23.

Cf. A. S. WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS AND WATERCOURSES 25 (4th ed., 1979).

24. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 57, U.N.
Doc. A./CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1280 (1982) [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §514 cmt. a (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See also Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294 (Oct. 12).
26. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, at art. 56. See also James E. Bailey III, The ExcLusive
Econmic Zone: Its Development and Fture in ntemational and Domestic Law, 45 LA. L. REV.
1269, 1270 (1985).
27. See Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v.
Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 74 (June 14).
28. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 41 (June 3).
29. Comp. 4, 5.
30. See RESTATEMENr, surq
24, at arts. 56, 61-62.

note 25, at § 514, Repone's Note 4. See also UNCLOS, spra ote
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B. Merapi is Liable for Its Unjustified Seizure of Erebian Fishing

Vessels in the Alma Shoals
1. Irrespective of the legal status of the Alma Shoals, Merapi's
seizure and subjection to forfeiture proceedings of the Erebian
fishing vessels is unlawful.
While under customary international law a coastal state has certain
economic rights in its EEZ, in all other respects, the zone retains the
attributes of the high seas. 3 ' Under customary international law, a ship
operating beyond territorial waters is functionally a floating island of the
country whose flag it flies, and as such, no other state may exercise
jurisdiction upon it without the flag state's consent." Under the UNCLOS,
a party-state may enforce fishing regulations in its EEZ by boarding,
inspecting, and arresting the vessel of another party-state believed to be out
of compliance with such regulations. 3 However, as a non-party to the
UNCLOS,"' Erebus never consented to such a regime.
Moreover, there is no indication that the Erebian-flagged vessels
were in violation of any regulatory regime. Prior to recent events,
Merapi had not objected to Erebian vessels fishing in the Shoals, 3 and
the actual count with which the seized vessels were charged was simply
"trespass."16
Additionally, the UNCLOS provides that when a ship is lawfully
seized, not only must the crew be promptly released, but also the vessel
itself must be released upon the posting of a reasonable bond. 3' Thus,
even if the UNCLOS's search and seizure provisions are found to be
applicable to the Erebian vessels, Merapi violated international law by
subjecting the vessels to forfeiture proceedings without affording
Erebus the option of posting a bond to secure their return.

31. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 514 cmt. b.
32. See The S.S. Lotus (Turk. v. Fr.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7). See
also Koru North American v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 229, 231 (1988).
33. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, at art. 73.
34. Comp. 8.
35. Clar. 3.
36. Comp. 7.
37. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, at arts. 73, 292. See generally The "Camouco" Case
(Pan. v. Fr.), 2000 ITLOS (Judgm. of Feb. 8), reprintedin 39 I.L.M. 666 (2000).
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2. Merapi's unlawful seizure and forfeiture of Erebian-flagged ships
provided Erebus the right to send naval vessels to protect Erebian
ships fishing in the Shoals.
When a state's rights have been denied or infringed under
international law that state has the right to respond with appropriate
defensive measures.'
Merapi's seizure of the Erebian ships was an
unlawful act; thus, Erebus clearly acted within its rights when it responded
by providing naval escorts to Erebian vessels wishing to operate in the
Alma Shoals. Moreover, the mere presence of naval vessels in the EEZ of
another state is a violation of neither customary international law, nor the
UNCLOS. 39

3. International law requires Merapi to return the six unlawfully
seized fishing vessels or make reparations to Erebus on behalf of
their owners.
Reparations must, to the extent possible, eliminate the consequences
of the breach of duty and restore the injured state to the position it would
have occupied if the breach had never occurred.'4 The unlawful seizure of
a ship at sea is a violation of the rights of the flag-state, not simply a
violation of the rights of the ship's owner and crew.4 ' Since the

requirement to exhaust effective local remedies before bringing an action
in an international tribunal applies only to cases in which the plaintiffstate is making a claim on behalf of a private citizen, it does not apply to
the case at hand.'2 Therefore, Merapi is obligated to redress the Erebian
injury by either returning the unjustly seized vessels to their owners, or
paying reparations equal to their value. 3

38. Cf. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 30 (Apr. 9).
39. See D.G. Stephens, The Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct of
PeacetimeNaval/Military Operations,29 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 283, 290 (1999).
40. See Factory at Chorzow (Merits) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 4748 (Sept. 13).
41. See The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2) Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 1999 ITLOS, paras. 9798 (Judgm. of July 1), available at < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/JudgE.htm >.
42. See id. See also Draft Articles of State Responsibility, [19801 11-2 Y.B. INT'L L. L.
COMM'N 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1 (Part 2); Phosphates in Morocco (Judgm.)
(Italy v. Fr.), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74, at 25 (June).
43. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 115 (1994).
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C. The Erebian Deep Seabed Mining Operation is not In Violation
of InternationalLaw.
1. International law imposes no obligation upon Erebus to refrain
from mining the deep seabed under international waters.
a. As a non-party, neither Part XI of the UNCLOS nor the 1994
Agreement on Implementing PartXI bind Erebus.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which
both Erebus and Merapi are parties," a treaty may obligate a non-party
only if it "expressly accepts that obligation in writing."4" As a non-party,
Erebus cannot be bound by the terms of either Part XI of the UNCLOS or
the 1994 Agreement on Implementing Part XI [hereinafter "Agreement"],
without its consent.
b. The seabed mining provisionsfound in PartXI of the UNCLOS and the
1994 Agreement have not ripened into customary internationallaw.
The opinio juris and consistent practice of a substantial number of
states evidence customary international law." International agreements
may lead to the creation of customary law only when they are intended for
general adherence and become widely accepted. 7 The party claiming a
customary international norm bears the burden of proving its existence."
Though the UNCLOS was signed by a majority of states, several
important industrialized nations, including the United States, refused to
sign it due to the "hopelessly flawed"1 seabed mining provisions
contained in Part XI. The Agreement made substantial changes to those
provisions in an effort to appease the industrialized world.-' However, it
apparently failed to appease the United States Senate, which has continued
44. Comp. 8.
45.

See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 35.

See also MCNAIR, supra note 1, at

309.
46. See The Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 191 (Dec. 18). See also SIR
GERALD FITZMAURICE, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
17-18 (1986).
47.

See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, at §102.

48. See Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 28.
49. White House Office of Policy Information, The Law of the Sea Convention, Issue
Update No. 10, at 8 (Apr. 15, 1983).
50. See E.D. Brown, Freedom of the High Seas Versus the Common Heritage of Mankind:
FundamentalPrinciples in Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 521 (1983).
51. See Bernard H. Oxman, The 1994 Agreement on Implementation of the Seabed
Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea: The 1994 Agreement and the Convention,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 687 (1994).

2001]

DistinguishedBrief

287

to block ratification.2 What the Agreement accomplished, though, was to
fracture any international conformity that may have existed regarding
acceptance of a seabed mining regime. Today, the UNCLOS has 158
signatories, while the Agreement, with its substantially altered provisions,
has only 79.53
Finally, the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority,
in his most recent annual report, admitted that it was too soon to tell if the
seabed mining regime would be successful as currently constructed?
Accordingly, it cannot be said that either the UNCLOS deep seabed mining
provisions or the Agreement have crystallized into customary international
law binding on Erebus.55
c. GeneralAssembly Resolutions proclaiming the seabed to be the
"common heritage of mankind" do not constitute customary international
law.
A General Assembly Resolution, in and of itself, is not legally binding
upon member states.' While General Assembly Resolutions may function as
a part of the larger customary law creating process, by themselves, they are
merely recommendations!,
In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
"Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed," which proclaimed the
deep seabed and its resources to be the "common heritage of mankind," and
provided that the exploitation of these resources had to be carried out to the
benefit of all mankind.- While the vote was unanimous, a number of states
made comments at the time of its adoption that the Declaration was intended
to be aspirational rather than binding59 Since a General Assembly
Resolution is not binding in the absence of other evidence of conforming
52. See John Alton Duff, UNCLOS and the New Deep Seabed Mining Regime: The Risks
of Refuting the Treaty, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 15, 32-33 (1995).
53. See II MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:
STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1999, ST/LEG/SER.E/18, 209, 242 (2000).
54. See Report of the Secretary-Generalof the InternationalSeabed Authority under article
166, paragraph4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/6/A/9 (June 6,

2000).
55.

See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, Part V: Introductory Note, at 7.

56. See Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory
of South-West Africa, 1955 I.C.J. 67, 115 (Sep. Op. of J. Lauterpact, June 7).
57. Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 254-55
(Advisory Op., July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].

58. See Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and Subsoil
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 GAOR Supp. (No. 28),

at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
59. See Brown, supra note 50, at 542-46.
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state practice, the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed does not
constitute customary international law.60
d. The United Nations Security Council PresidentialStatement does not
legally obligate Erebus to delay commencement of its seabed mining
operation.
Security Council Presidential Statements are informal documents,
which should not be interpreted as creating legal obligations.61 Whereas
Chapter VII Resolutions are formal statements of the will of the Council,
and as such have the force of law, Presidential Statements are the product
of informal consultations between the Council President and members, and
not a decision by the body as a whole.Y These informal consultations are
not Security Council "meetings;" in fact, they have no legal status as the
Council's procedural rules make no reference to them. 3 Additionally,
informal consultations, unlike formal Security Council meetings, do not
afford "a party to a dispute under consideration,"" such as Erebus, its right
under Article 32 of the United Nations Charter to participate in Council debates.0
In light of these facts, the Presidential Statement dated August 15, 2000,
should not be interpreted as having legally obligated Erebus to delay its
seabed mining operation.
It should be noted that this Court has previously determined that it
lacks the power of "judicial review," and is thus, incapable of passing
judgment upon the validity of a Security Council action." However, it is
within this Court's ability to interpret the purpose and meaning of a Security
Council instrument.67

60. See id. at 540-41.
61. Cf SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAVIS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL 65 (3d ed., 1998).

62. C id. at 65, 547.
63. See id. See also Michael C. Wood, Security Council Working Methods and
Procedures: Recent Developments, 45 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 150, 155 (1996).
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 32.

65.
Making,
66.
20).
67.

See Loie Feuerle, Informal Consultation: A Mechanism In Security Council Decision18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 267, 298 (1985).
See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.CJ. 151, 168 (Advisory Op., July
See, e.g., East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 103-04 (June 30).
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2. The Erebian facility conforms to the customary international law
doctrine of freedom of the high seas and the duty of states to protect
the natural environment.
The freedom to use the high seas, the air space above them, and the
seabed may only be limited or modified by a general consensus amongst
states.68 Thus, in the absence of a universally recognized seabed mining
regime, the doctrine of freedom of the high seas remains controlling.'
According to this doctrine, deep seabed mining is permitted as long as the
state conducting such activity gives reasonable regard for the rights of
others engaged in similar activities,70 and adequately complies with its
customary law duty to protect the environment'

In April 2000, Erebus announced its intention to begin mining
manganese nodules in international waters. 7 No state or individual has
suggested to Erebus that this project will interfere with their similar
operation. Erebus complied with its duty to safeguard the environment by
conducting an exhaustive environmental impact assessment, which has
vouched for the project's safety.73 While others less familiar with the project
have disputed its environmental soundness,' it should be noted that when
faced with similarly conflicting environmental studies in the past, this
Court as declined to weigh their relative merit." Since Erebus has satisfied
all requirements of freedom of the high seas doctrine, the seabed mining
project is permitted by customary international law.
3. Merapi is estopped from asserting that the Erebian seabed mining
facility is in violation of international law.
The principle of estoppel bars a state's claim when a state has
maintained an inconsistent position in regard to a matter of fact or law. 6 An
68. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den; Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 103
(Sep. Op. of J. Ammoun, Feb. 20).
69. See Brown, supra note 50, 559-60.
70. See id.
71. Cf. The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7,41 (Sept.
25). See Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 241-42.
72. Comp. 9.
73. Comp. 10; Clar. 4.
74. Comp. 10.
75. See Gabcikovo, 1997 I.C.J. at 41.
76. See Tenple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 42 (Sep. Op. of J. aro, June
15); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4,17, 25 (Feb. 5); Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 l.C.J. 92,118 (Sept. 13); Fisheries Case,
1951 I.C.J. at 138-39.
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estoppel by acquiescence results when a plaintiff-state is provided ample
opportunity to protest what it believes is an infringement of its rights, but
remains silent, thus, leading the defendant-state to believe that its conduct is
acceptable."
Erebus announced to the world its intention to begin deep seabed
mining 500 nautical miles off Merapi's coast. 8 Merapi did not protest
Erebus's plan for several critical months during which Erebus, relying
upon Merapi's silent acceptance, poured vast economic resources into the
project. 9 Merapi is, thus, estopped from objecting to the Erebian seabed
mining facility.
D. Merapi is Liable for the Destruction of the Erebian Seabed
Mining Facility and the Killing of ErebianNationals
1. Under the Principles of State Responsibility, Merapi is
responsible for the Aqua Protectors' attack, either by its acts or by
its omissions.
a. Merapi's act of providingfinancial support to the Aqua Protectors with
priorknowledge of theirplanned attack againstthe Erebianfacility
amounts to a use offorce against the property and citizens of Erebus.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force in
international relations 0 The term "use of force" is not limited to
conventional military force, but also prohibits states from "organizing or
encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands... for
incursion into the territory of another state.""
Merapi's financial support of the Aqua Protectors with knowledge of their
objective was an act of "encouraging" their plan to attack the Erebian facility.
Erebus's seabed mining facility isjurisdictionally a part of Erebian territory, just as
Erebian ship on the high seas would be.12 Thus, Merapi's support for the
operation conducted by the Aqua Protectors is a violation of the prohibition
against the use of force.
77. See Christopher Brown, Comment:

A Comparative and Critical Assessment of

Estoppel in InternationalLaw, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 369, 397 (1995).

78. Comp. 9.
79. Comp. 17.
80.

See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.

81. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and CoOperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25
* U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.28), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). See also Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101 (June 27).

82. Cf. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 18.
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b. Since Merapi had knowledge that an attack on Erebus was
being planned on Merapin territory, Merapi was obligated to warn Erebus
and to take other reasonable measures to prevent the Aqua Protectors'
attack.
Customary international law requires that states use "due diligence"
to prevent their territory from being used for the purposes of attacks on
other states with whom they are not at war." Since states exercise
exclusive control over their territory, victim states are at a disadvantage
when attempting to establish facts necessary to prove such a breach of
duty. 8' Under these circumstances, victim states are entitled to a relaxed
burden of proof, and a more generous allowance for circumstantial
evidence and inference.95
In the Corfu Channel Case, two British ships struck mines in
Albanian waters, sustaining serious damage and loss of life." This Court
found, by way of circumstantial evidence, that Albania knew of the mines,
and thus, breached international law by not warning others of the danger.81
This Court also found the duty to warn to be part of the obligation of all
states not to allow knowingly their territory to be used for attacks on other
states."
Merapi knew the Aqua Protectors where planning an attack on
Erebus's seabed mining facility from their headquarters in Merapin
territory, 9 yet it neither acted to prevent the attack nor to warn Erebus of
it. Thus, Merapi has incurred responsibility for the attack.
2. Merapi's suppbrt of the Aqua Protectors was not justified as an
act of self-defense consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter.
a. Article 51 of the United Nations Charterdoes not authorize
anticipatoryself-defensive attacks.
The plain meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
prohibits a state from resorting to the use of force before it has been the
subject of a military attack. Article 51 states: "Nothing in the present

83. See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887). See also FITZMAURICE, supra
note 46, at 21.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See FITZMAURICE, supra note 46, at 128.
See id.
See Corfu, 1949 I.C.J. at 10.
See id.at 18-23.
See id.at 22.

89.

Comp.

18.
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Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense ifan armed attack occurs ...
Merapi was never subjected to
an armed attack.
While some publicists have argued that Article 51's use of the phrase
"inherent right of self-defense" preserved the right as it existed prior to the
Charter, and thus, includes a right of anticipatory self-defense, 9' others have
pointed out that such a reading renders the words "if an armed attack occurs"
inoperable.- Publicist Philip Jessup believed that Article 51 did not codify a right
to anticipatory self-defense: "Under the Charter, alarming military preparations
by a neighboring state would justify a resort to the Security Council, but
would not justify resort to anticipatory force. ...""
Additionally, the case for anticipatory self-defense is weakened by the
fact that consistently large numbers of states have condemned, censured, or
disapproved of uses of force justified on the basis of anticipatory selfdefense.9' The best historic analogy is the 1981 Israeli bombing of a
partially constructed Iraqi nuclear reactor. Israel justified its attack as
anticipatory self-defense, since it feared that Iraq would use the reactor to
produce fissionable material for weapons to be used against it." However,
the Security Council unanimously rejected this defense in a resolution,
which stated that the attack was a "clear violation of the charter of the
United Nations and the norms of international conduct.""
b. Even ifanticipatoryself-defense were legitimate under Article 51, the
potentialfor economic harm does not constitute an "armedattack"
triggeringthe right of self-defense.
Even if the United Nations Charter allowed anticipatory selfdefense, Merapi's contention that economic harm can be the equivalent
of an armed attack" is without merit. During the 1945 negotiations of the
United Nations Charter in San Francisco, the drafters confirmed that
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
91.

See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 257

(1963). See also TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR 150, 151 (1996).
92. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1634 (1984). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 43, at 182-84 (1994).

93. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1968).
94. See STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (1996).

SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN

95. See id.
at 191.
96. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487

(1981).
97. Comp. 14.
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economic embargoes did not constitute an unlawful use of force, let alone
armed attack." State practice has never recognized economic harm as
justifying the use of force.
Merapi claims its economic dependence on the fish-stock within the
Grand Basin means that a threat to that resource is the same as an armed
attack on Merapi itself." Merapi's argument is similar to the economic
justifications for the use of force used by France, Great Britain, and Israel
during the 1956 Suez Canal crisis.'0 All three nations justified their actions
at least partly on the economic necessity of maintaining the flow of traffic
through the canal.'01 However, an overwhelming majority of nations
rejected their rationalizations, as the General Assembly voted 64 to five to

denounce their actions. 102
c. Internationallaw does not allow a state to intervene in anticipationof
environmentaldamage outside of its EEZ.
The practice and opinio juris of states indicate that a right to
environmental intervention on the high seas has not been internationally
recognized. This was recently confirmed in the Canadian-Spanish dispute,
which began when Canada amended its laws to authorize its officials to use
force to board foreign vessels in international waters to prevent overfishing of stocks important to Canada's economy.101 In 1995, Canadian
naval forces chased, fired upon and captured a Spanish fishing vessel
suspected of violating Canadian law and regulations.' ° Spain strenuously
objected to Canada's unilateral extension of jurisdiction into international
waters. 0 1 As part of the settlement that ensued, Canada was required to
repeal the statutes allowing for the seizure of foreign ships in international
waters.'06 Thus, Merapi's concern for the marine environment of the Grand
Basin cannot justify a use of force against the Erebian facility.

98. See ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A. J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION:
LAW AND IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 410-11 (1956).

THE

99. Comp. 14.
100. See Quincy Wright, Intervention, 1956, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 271-73 (1957).
101. See id. at 272.
102. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 94, at 152.

103. See Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C., ch. C-33, §7 (1994) (Can.), reprintedin
33 I.L.M. 1383, 1386 (1994).
104. See Fieries Jurialditin Cam (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.CJ. at para. 19 (Dec. 4), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibonaibonajudgmentslibomijudgment_19991213.hun.
105. See id. 20.
106. See id.
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d. In any event, Merapi's actions are inconsistent with the customary
internationallaw requirements of "necessity" and "proportionality."
Customary international law holds that the use of self-defense must be
necessary and proportional.'10 These requirements stem from the Caroline
incident, as to which U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote that
self-defense must be limited to situations in which the "necessity of the
self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation. "'0

Additionally, Webster wrote that a

necessary action must also be proportionate in that it "must be limited by
that necessity, and kept clearly within it." °0
. Merapi's actions cannot meet the requirement of necessity
because Merapi did not first exhaust all possible peaceful
measures available to it.
Before self-defense can be "necessary," a state must exhaust all of
potential peaceful means of settling the dispute. 110 Article 2(3) of. the
United Nations Charter requires states to "settle their international disputes
by peaceful means .... "111 Article 33(1) requires that attempts be made to
resolve disputes by means, such as "negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement..." prior to the use of force. 112
Merapi failed to exhaust this list of potential peaceful settlement means
prior to launching its attack. Therefore, Merapi's actions were in violation
of the requirement of "necessity."
ii. Merapi's actions cannot meet the requirement of necessity
since the Security Council was actively engaged in the matter.
Self-defense under Article 51 is limited to the time prior to the
Security Council's engagement in a dispute.-3 Once the Security Council is
involved in a dispute, it has sole authority to "determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression....
Mere days before the Aqua Protectors attacked the seabed mining facility,
the Security Council stated its intent "to remain seized of the matter. ' 115
107. See Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
108. BROWNLIE, supra note 91, at 42-43.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 261.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3; art. 33, para. 1.
Id. art. 2, para. 3.
Id. art. 33, para. 1
Seeid. art. 51.
Id. art. 39.
Comp. 15.
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Thus, Merapi's actions were not "necessary" as the Security Council was

actively engaged in the dispute.'6
iii.
Merapi's actions cannot meet the requirement of
proportionality since the attack needlessly resulted in the death
of civilians.
A proportionate self-defensive use of force is one that is equal to its
necessity, not one that is equal to the initial threat." 7 Thus, no matter how
great a threat Merapi may have believed the Erebian seabed mining facility
posed to its security, proportionality required Merapi to use self-defensive
measures that were only equal to what was required to eliminate that
threat."" Merapi and its agents, the Aqua Protectors, could have given
warning (even just a few minutes) to ensure that the Erebian civilians could
be evacuated from the temporary platforms before the detonation of the
explosives."19 The loss of life that accompanied the Aqua Protectors'
attack',2 was unjustified; thus, the attack was disproportionate.
e. Merapi had no implied authorizationfrom the Security Council to
attack the Erebian seabed mining facility.
In every past case in which the Security Council authorized the use of
force (Iraq,"' Bosnia,'" Somalia,'" Rwanda,1'2 Haiti"'), it employed the
phrase "all necessary means," which does not appear in this Presidential
Statement.'- In the absence of this talismanic phrase, authorization to use
force should not be read into the actions of the Security Council.
Resolutions and statements from the Security Council are often the subject
of intense negotiations. Allowing tenuous assertions of authorization for
116. Comp.

12.

117. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 94, at 165.

118. See id.
119. Comp.

16.

120. See id.

121. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990).

122.
(1992).
123.
(1992).
124.
(1994).
125.
(1994).
126.

S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/770
S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRESI794
S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392nd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929
S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
Comp. 12.
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the use of force to be read into these instruments effectively undoes their
negotiations.'" For this reason, the Court should reject any assertion by
Merapi that the Presidential Statement implicitly authorized their use of
force.

E. InternationalLaw Requires Merapi to Compensate Erebusfor the
Destruction of the Mining Facility and Killing of Erebian
Nationals, as well as Surrender the Perpetratorsof the Attack to
Erebusfor Prosecution
1. International law requires Merapi to compensate for the unlawful
destruction of Erebian property.
Reparations must be set at a level equal to the cost of repairing or
replacing the destroyed property plus any lost profits, which the property
may reasonably have been expected to produce. 128 Merapi is thus required
to compensate Erebus for the cost of repairing the seabed mining facility
and the cost of purchasing manganese, cobalt, nickel, and copper on the
open market for the period of time that will be required to repair the
facility.
2. International law requires Merapi to compensate for the unlawful
killing of Erebian citizens.
International law gives states the right to bring claims for the
injuries suffered by their nationals. '29 Though the state is asserting its
own rights and not acting in a representative capacity, the damages are,
nonetheless, measured by the injury suffered by the citizens or their
estates.," Six Erebian citizens were killed by Merapi's attack on the seabed
mining facility.", Thus, Merapi is liable to Erebus for these citizens'
injuries, measured by the loss to their estates.

127. See Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good' or "Bad" War?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 842

1999).
128. See Chorzow, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 47-48.

129. See FITZMAURICE, supra note 46, at 26.
130. See id.
131. Comp.

16.
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3. International law requires Merapi to surrender the members of
the Aqua Protectors responsible for the attack on the seabed mining
facility.
a. The customary internationallaw principle of aut dedere aut judicare
requiresMerapi to extradite or prosecute the Aqua Protectors.
States have a duty under the customary international law principle of
aut dedere autjudicare to either extradite persons accused of terrorism and
other international crimes, or prosecute them under their own laws. 32 This
duty is rooted in the principles of state responsibility and starts from the
assumption that when an international crime is committed, the injured state
has a right to punish the perpetrators.' As a fundamental duty to respect
the sovereign rights of fellow states, the duty applies equally with regards
to aliens and nationals.'34

While the international crime of terrorism has no precise definition,
terrorist activities have certain characteristics, which include the
victimization of innocent third parties, and the targeting of non-military
facilities.'" Given these characteristics, the Aqua Protectors are clearly
terrorists, as their targeting of a non-military installation killed innocent
civilians.
Since the duty of aut dedere aut judicare is a part of so many multinational treaties dealing with international crimes such as terrorism,' 3 6 it may
be deemed to have ripened into customary international law.'" Thus, Merapi
has a duty to prosecute or extradite the Aqua Protectors even in the absence
of a specific treaty obligation. In light of Merapi's involvement in the
132. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE
DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL Law 22-24 (1995). See also IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 315 (4th ed. 1990).
133. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 132, at 38-39.
134. See II HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACiS LIBRI TRES, 529 (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1995) See also I1 E. DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW 136-37 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1995).

135. See Draft Single Convention on the Legal Control of InternationalTerrorism, Int'l Law
Ass'n (1980), reprinted in RICHARD B. LILLICH, TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM CONVENTIONS
AND COMMENTARY 199 (1982).
136. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,

1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, art. VII; International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. G.A. Res. 34/145 (XXXIV), 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.46),

at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/146, arts. 7-8; Convention and Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted by the International Maritime
Organization, at Rome, Mar. 10, 1988, I.M.O. Doc. SUA/CON/15, arts. 10-11; International

Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, Jan. 9, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/52/653, art.
8.
137. See BASSIOUNI, supranote 132, at 47.
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actions of the Aqua Protectors and its failure to arrest or bring criminal
charges against them,'' extradition is required because Merapi cannot
realistically be expected to prosecute this case diligently. 39
b. Merapi has displayed a lack of good faith in its invocation of the
political offense exception to the duty to extradite.
Under the political offense exception, states may refuse the
extradition of fugitives accused of crimes of a political nature. '4
While the exception is applied according to the standards of the state
from which extradition is requested,"' like all decisions affecting relations
between States, its application is subject to a duty of good faith." 2 Since

a principal justification for the exception is to maintain neutrality in other
states' political conflicts, good faith requires a nonpolitical branch, i.e. the
judiciary, to determine the exception's applicability."4 Merapi's invocation

of the exception exhibits a lack of good faith. Firstly, Merapi has refused
to submit the issue to its court system for a nonpolitical determination.
Secondly, the Aqua Protectors do not qualify as political offenders under
any of the tests applied by the international community.
Under the political-incidence test employed by most common law
countries, a crime is considered a political offense when the perpetrator is
a member of an organization engaged in a political uprising and the crime
is committed in furtherance of that uprising.'" Erebus has not witnessed a
political uprising; thus, the actions of the Aqua Protectors cannot be
deemed to further a political uprising.
Under the proportionality test employed by most civil law countries,
the political element must predominate over the act's common crime
aspects in order for it to be considered a political offense.' However,
138. Comp. 119; Clar. 6.
139. See Oral Pleadings of the United States, Question and Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention'Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Prelim. Obj., at 3.59, 3.61 (Oct. 15, 1997), available at
http://www. icj-cij .org/icjwww/idocketlilus/iluscr/ilusicr9719.htm.
140. See Michael R. Littenberg, The Political Offense Exception: An Historical Analysis
and Model for the Future, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1196 (1990).
141. See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of
ExtraditionLaw, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1227 (1962).
142. C. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (7th ed., 1996).
143. Cf. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986).
144. See id. at 806-07. See generally In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 (1890).
145. See CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO
EXTRADITION 127 (1980). See, e.g., In re Peruzzo, [1952] INT'L L. REP. 369 (1951) (Swit.).
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like the political-incidence test, the crime must be committed in the
confines of the political uprising.'" Again, since Erebus has not been the
subject of political unrest, the Aqua Protectors' attack cannot constitute a
political offense.
The French political objective test focuses on the nature of the injury,
rather than on the intent of the perpetrator. 47 Under this test it would be irrelevant
whether the Aqua Protectors intended a political result, as the question would be
whether the injury resulting was solely to the state.'" Under the political objective
test, treason, espionage, and even the destruction of government property
would qualify as political offenses, however, the killing of civilians, as
occurred in the present case,' would not.
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the reasons stated above, the Republic of Erebus respectfully
requests that this Honorable Court:
1. DECLARE that by virtue of the change in course of the principal arm
of the Krakatoa River, the Alma Shoals lie within the EEZ of Erebus,
and its citizens and vessels, therefore, have a right to fish there;
2.

DECLARE that its proposed deep seabed mining operations are
consistent with international law;

3.

DECLARE that Merapi violated international law through its
involvement in the terrorist attack against the Erebian seabed mining
facility, and by its seizure and detention of the six Erebian vessels;

4.

ORDER Merapi to pay Erebus U.S. $1.2 billion in compensation for
the damage to the facility, the loss of human life, and the loss of future
seabed mining revenue; and

5.

ORDER Merapi to surrender the members of the Aqua Protectors
responsible for the attack on the seabed mining facility to Erebus for
prosecution, as well as to release the Erebian fishing vessels.

146.
147.
148.
149.

See Garcia-Mora, supra note 141, at 1249-53.
See id. at 1249-50.
See id.
Comp. 16.
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